Showing posts with label FYROM Name Issue. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FYROM Name Issue. Show all posts

Winemakers' suit over Macedonia PDO

Thursday, December 9, 2010

 A local cooperative of winemakers in northern Greece on Wednesday announced that it will file a lawsuit in Germany against distributors and super market retailers offering wines from the neighbouring former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYRoM) under the indication "Macedonia".
The president of the Association of Winemakers & Viticulturalists of Northern Greece (ENOABE), Yiannis Voyiatzis, noted that several retailers in Germany have already complied with European law and removed the wines from their shelves.

The term "Macedonia" enjoys a European Union-mandated Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) status for wines produced in the Greek province of Macedonia, which dominates northern Greece and is the land mass linked with historical and geographical Macedonia.


"This specific geographic designation is only allowed for wines emanating from the geographic province of Macedonia in Greece," Voyiatzis.

Along those lines, he noted that the...
 circulation of wines from the former Yugoslav republic to Greece's immediate north bearing the stand-alone name "Macedonia" or "Macedonian" was recently banned in Slovenia, as well.


According to the ENOABE president, his association has been in contact with the Greek embassies in all EU member-states in order to ascertain whether similar instances of illegal wine branding has occurred.

(ANA-MPA)

PM Gruevski´s hardline policy leaves FYROM out of NATO summit yet again

Saturday, November 27, 2010

Australian Macedonian Advisory Council
November 26, 2010

FYROM Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski´s hardline policy to his country´s naming dispute with Greece has once again caused FYROM to not be invited to take part in the latest NATO summit (where new members are then invited to join the Alliance) which took place on 20 November 2010 in Lisbon.

Immediately after the summit, instead of taking responsibility for his failure once again for FYROM to be invited to join the NATO alliance (after its failure to join NATO in 2008 and a stagnant EU candidature in 2010 (http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=9321518&maindocimg=9318247&service=96&showLink=true), Gruevski stated that his country "had not joined NATO, because of ´interference´ from Greece, due the name issue".

Meanwhile, the citizens of the FYROM (of whom 35% are of Albanian origin) are becoming....
 more restless with the current government´s inability to solve the dispute with Greece and to become integrated in EU and NATO institutions, which will provide much needed security and economic assistance to the country. The Left-wing opposition party (SDSM) has urged snap election after FYROM failed to join NATO for a second time (http://www.emg.rs/en/news/region/139238.html).

The Greek President Karolos Papoulias has sent yet another message to the government in FYROM after the NATO summit, urging that "as long as they insist on their intransigent positions, so much the more they shall keep the door of NATO closed and the accession procedure towards the European Union frozen" (http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=9321518&maindocimg=9318247&service=96&showLink=true).
Greece can hardly be blamed for FYROM´s situation. Since Gruevski´s nationalist party, the VMRO-DPMNE, took power in 2006 his government has engaged in a string of provocations towards its neighbours:
  • In 2007 renamed Skopje Airport as ´Alexander the Great Airport´
  • In February 2008 Gruevski was photographed laying a wreath at the tomb of a 19th century revolutionary and a map of "United Macedonia" which includes parts of Greece and Bulgaria
  • Erected a statue of Alexander the Great in Prilep
  • In January 2009 renamed the main highway which runs through FYROM from Serbia to Greece ´Alexander of Macedon´ highway
  • In December 2008 the national stadium in Skopje, ´Gradski Stadium´, was renamed ´Philip II Arena´
  • In 2009 plans were announced for the construction of 22-meter fountain and statue of Alexander the Great in Skopje´s Central Square
Various foreign and domestic observers have expressed their concerns at the intense ´antiquization´ or ´antique macedonization´ of FYROM under Gruevski borne out in the provocations mentioned above. According to an article in FYROM newspaper Dnevnik (6 August 2009), a poll conducted in FYROM showed that 59% of the respondents believed that PM Nikola Gruevski should focus all his efforts on the economy, rather than his ´Ancient Macedonia´ or ´Antiquization´ program.

These provocations are in violation of the Interim Accord, signed by Greece and FYROM in 1995, under which FYROM was allowed to be admitted as a member of the UN (http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r225.htm).

Various NATO and EU reports on FYROM´s progress have noted Gruevski´s government´s provocations towards Greece are deliberate intransigence concerning the UN-brokered name negotiations with Greece. EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn has also criticised the "ongoing use of the language of hatred in some [FYROM] media not only against Greece, but also against Bulgaria". A Greek Foreign Minister spokesman has also reiterated that FYROM Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki, amongst others, at "every opportunity attacks Greece in a provocative way and burdens the UN framework procedure" (http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=9341595&service=142).

Mr. Gruevski should focus on his country´s crippling unemployment, which is now at a staggering 33% and is the highest in Europe, instead of deflecting domestic attention away from this serious problem by the making of various nationalistic stunts which provoke Greece and other neighbours.

The Australian Macedonian Advisory Council (AMAC) believes that it is now time for PM Gruevski´s government to abandon its nationalistic approach and work closely within the UN framework to solve the naming dispute with Greece, which will ensure that the FYROM´s integration into EU and NATO structures, or risk becoming permanently isolated.

Understanding the Macedonian Name Dispute and its importance to the United States

Sunday, November 7, 2010

by Ioannis Fidanakis
President of Pan Thracian Union of America “Orpheus”.

It’s been 19 years since a small former republic of Yugoslavia declared independence and attempted to hijack the history, identity and name of the ancient Greek Kingdom of Macedonia. Originally known as Vardar Banovina, the region was renamed by Josip Broz Tito in the aftermath of the Second World War. The name chosen by Tito was the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, an ideal chose as it allowed him to promote the concept of an oppressed ‘Macedonian ethnicity’, in which he could develop the idea of reunification of the greater geographic region in hopes of gaining access to the Aegean Sea, through the Greek port city of Thessaloniki. With the fall of the former Yugoslavia the republic was admitted into the United Nations under the provisional name, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Much has changed since this disagreement between Greece and FYROM began in 1991. The world is a much different place now, and despite a world economic crisis Athens and Skopje continue to fight over the word ‘Macedonia’.

Most Americans are ignorant of the name dispute and those that have some type of understanding find it ridiculous to fight over a name. Their inability to understand the Greek position is the failure of Greek America to properly explain their concerns to the average American. It is with this said, that a new campaign has been launched hoping to educate and bring attention to the Greek position concerning the name dispute. Focused on....
 rejuvenating the Greek side within Greece, the new campaign has been organized by the world wide Pan-Macedonian Associations based throughout the Greek Diaspora. The campaign hopes to bring attention to the injustices being committed against the historical and cultural identity of 2.5 million ethnic Greeks who live in the Greek province of Macedonia and maintain a century’s long Macedonian identity.

The violations, in which these Macedonians wish to bring attention to, is FYROM’s insistence on de-Hellenizing the Macedonian identity and using it to describe a new Slavic ethnicity with no historical connect to the ancient Macedonians. It is this attempt to exclusively use the word ‘Macedonia’ to identify their multiethnic state, which has upset Greece and its 2.5 million real Macedonians. Campaign organizers claim in their mission statement that;
‘There is no doubt that the exclusive use of the name ‘Macedonia’, primarily adopted by the FYROM Slavs and their promotions as ‘ethnic Macedonians’ is a stimulus for expansionist claims by FYROM and its Diaspora. Claims to ‘their right to self-identification’ are unjustified and violate our rights. We therefore strongly object that a Slavic nation, north of Greece, can use the name ‘Macedonian’ to identity its citizens, a term that forms part of Greece’s history and culture for thousands of years. Recognition of a ‘Macedonian’ ethnicity, clearly and without a doubt, would claim anything Macedonian, including history, culture and even land, destabilizing among others the entire region’ (www.macedoniaontheweb.eu).

In trying to understand the concerns of the 2.5 million real Macedonians living in Greece one must become familiar with the main four concerns ethnic Greeks have with FYROM and its Slavic pretenders to the Macedonian identity. The first is based around historical concerns dealing with the actual history of ancient Macedonia and its legacy in the culture and history of Greece. It is the belief of ethnic Greeks living in the province of Macedonia and the numerous Pan-Macedonian Associations throughout the Greek Diaspora that FYROM’s attempt to use the name ‘Macedonian’ to describe its citizens is a direct attempt to construct a continuity between them and the ancient Macedonians. A concern that is justified by FYROM’s continued use of the ancient Pan-Hellenic symbol known as the Vergina sun on flags used in FYROM and throughout its Diaspora, the renaming of Skopje’s National Airport to ‘Alexander the Great Airport’ and news reports about plans to construct an eight-story high statue of Alexander the Great in the center of the country’s capital city of Skopje. These are just a taste of some of the historical revisionist attempts to steal the history of ancient Macedonia from Greece.

The second major concern focuses on territorial claims by FYROM against Greece, which date back to the time of the Second World War. Concerns that were once shared by US diplomats in 1944. It is the opinion of Greece that FYROM has territorial ambitions to annex the Greek province of Macedonia and move its capital from Skopje to the Greek city of Thessaloniki. Evidence justifying Greek concerns can be found in schoolbooks and official government publications in FYROM, which show not only the Greek province of Macedonia as part of a Greater FYROM, but also parts of Bulgaria. As recent as 2008, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyanni complained when a photograph appeared with FYROM’s current Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski standing next to a map of ‘Greater FYROM’.

The next issue revolves around the argument of Self-determination. No one can argue that the people of FYROM do not have the right to exist as a free and independent nation; however, do they have the right to impose upon themselves an identity, which has been in use by ethnic Greeks for centuries? Is FYROM’s use of this identity not an act of plagiarism and identity theft in an attempt to justify their own nation’s existence? Finally the last concern and issue of the Name Dispute revolves around the identification of the national language of FYROM as ‘Macedonian’. Until now the idea of a Macedonian ‘language’ has only been used to identify the ancient Macedonian dialect, which was closely related to ancient Doric and/or Aeolic Greek, and has also been applied to the present-day Greek dialect spoken by ethnic Greeks in the province of Macedonia. And yet it has been FYROM’s mission to use the term to identify their national language, which is seen by many as a dialect of the Bulgarian language. Is it historically accurate to use the term ‘Macedonian’ to identify a language that does not decent from the actual ancient Macedonian language and instead comes from a completely different branch of the Indo-European language family?

With this said, one can now take an honest look at the recent developments and ongoing stalemate between Athens and Skopje over the use of the word ‘Macedonia’. Throughout the years various names have been proposed such as ‘New Macedonia’, ‘Slavo-Macedonia’, ‘Vardar Republic’, and ‘Republic of Skopje’, to name just a few, however, none have been warmly accepted by both sides. In hopes of promoting peace and stability in the region, only Greece has slowly revised its position, showing its willingness to find a solution and end the conflict. While FYROM has instead allowed a Nationalistic and Racist political party to take control of its government and harden its ridiculous revisionist stance on the name issue. FYROM’s current government has created an atmosphere in which academics, journalists, and politicians who dare to speak of compromise receive death threats.

The Importance of the Name issue to American Interests in the region

American interests in this region are much different then those of Athens or Skopje. They are not interested in the historical accuracy of FYROM’s name or possibilities of cultural and historical identity theft. For the United States all that matters is regional stability and FYROM’s full integration into the NATO alliance and the European Community, interests vital to the United States which have been stalled by the name dispute and almost lost completely due to an Albanian insurrection in 2001. It was this armed conflict between the National Liberation Army, an offshoot of the Kosovo Liberation Army and FYROM security forces that exposed the serious risk instability that threatens FYROM’s very existence.

This brief Albanian insurgency officially began in January 2001 with attacks on FYROM security forces along the border with United Nations occupied Kosovo. It followed a similar pattern to the Albanian uprising in Kosovo and was led by former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The insurgency lasted several months and finally ended with the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, a peace deal signed by the government of FYROM and Albanian representatives on August 13, 2001. Under the agreement FYROM was officially altered, its government adopting a new model of decentralization and Albanian becoming its second official language.

As a result the United States went ahead and recognized FYROM as the ‘Republic of Macedonia’ on November 4th, 2004, claiming that is was done in support of FYROM’s decision to honor the Ohrid agreement. However, it seems odd that if the United States wished to promote a multi-ethnic democracy within the borders of FYROM, why would choose to recognize a name the makes FYROM a nation-state of one particular ethnicity rather then supporting a name the best describes the new decentralized states multi-ethnic identity? The American decision to recognize FYROM as ‘Macedonia’, came only days before a reported settlement was to be announced ending the name dispute, as a result the Bush Administration’s recognition of FYROM as ‘Macedonia’, radicalized FYROM’s government and harden their position making it almost impossible to find a solution with Greece over the name dispute.

During the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest FYROM failed to receive an invitation to join the alliance due to its failure to resolve the name dispute. This non-invitation hurts American interests in the region and is solely due to FYROM failure to negotiate with NATO member Greece. Rather then seeking a compromise FYROM has instead waged an unforgivable smear campaign against an American ally, circulating irredentist maps claiming Greek territory and allowing a poster to be displayed in Skopje altering the Greek flag to display a swastika in place of the white cross found on the Greek national flag. In the end the Greek position was supported by such countries as France and Spain, as well as by Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg, Iceland, Belgium, Hungary, Slovakia and the Netherlands.

In response to the FYROM’s non-invitation, ethnic Albanians issued a warning in 2009 claiming that their ‘patience was wearing thin’ over FYROM’s failure to come to a solution with Greece, hence preventing the country’s acceptance into NATO and the EU. This statement was covered by an article published in 2009 by the Serbian news agency B92 entitled ‘FYROM: Albanians ‘warning’ over name dispute’. A similar news report surfaced later that very year by the FOCUS News Agency. FYROM’s inability to come to a solution with Greece over the use of the word ‘Macedonia’ is slowly starting to eat away at the fragile peace between Slavs and Albanians within its borders. Signs of renewed violence have begun to appear with illegal weapons and uniforms bearing KLA insignias being found this past April near the border with Serbia. A month later 4 ethnic Albanians wearing uniforms with KLA insignia’s were killed by FYROM police. Time is running out for FYROM and American interests are at risk. If ethnic Albanians renew their armed struggle, the fragile stability which has been held since the signing of the Ohrid agreement could be lost.

What is needed now is for America to reverse the Bush Administrations ill-advised recognition of FYROM as ‘Macedonia’, which would force FYROM to come to a compromise with Greece before another Albanian insurgency begins which could destabilize the entire region and further hurt American interests. The only clear solution to the name dispute is FYROM’s adoption of a name that best identifies its multi-ethnic identity. However, if the government of FYROM is hell-bent on adopting a historical name for their new state there are two opinions that have seemingly gone unnoticed by Greece and FYROM as names that would give the newly found state the historical identity they are searching for. The first being a name connected to the short lived Kingdom of Prilep. The capital of which was located within present-day borders of FYROM. By adopting the name ‘Republic of Prilep’, FYROM can legitimately produce continuity between their new republic and a 14th century Kingdom. The next opinion is a name based on the Byzantine term of the first Slavic settlements in the region, which were independent from the Empire. By adopting a name like the ‘Republic of Sklavinia’, FYROM is able to adopt not only a historical regional identity, but actually an identity that makes them the father of all Slavic nations in the Balkans, seeing that the term is derived from the word ‘Sclaveni’, which described all Southern Slavs, which eventually became the Serbian, Bulgarian and Croatian nations.

Source:globalpolitician.com

Prospects for resolving the name issue -- presentation by Dr. E. Kofos at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Rose-Roth Seminar (Skopje 20.10.2010)

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

The organizers of the seminar have asked me to discuss the “Prospects for resolving the name issue”. For someone like me, a native of Macedonia, who, for half a century, has been studying the Macedonian question or being involved with contemporary Macedonian issues, it was not an easy task. For help, I turned to the Athenian philosopher Antisthenis, a contemporary and friend of Socrates: I found his advice, «αρχή σοφίας η των ονομάτων επίσκεψις», an appropriate way to approach our problem. In English, his dictum could be rendered as, “the foundation of wisdom, is the definition of the names”

The first mistake we, the contemporaries, have made in dealing with the “name issue” was to ignore his advice. And naturally we failed.

The traditional “Macedonian Question”-- traced from the last decades of the
19th century to the mid-20th century-- was a contest mainly over territories, and as such an issue of regional and international security. During the latter part of the 20th century, up to this day, it has evolved, mainly, as an issue of identities.

Claims over territories have been dealt by wars, uprisings, persistent insecurity. On the other hand, contested identities, are hard to decipher, particularly by outsiders, who tend to underestimate, or denigrate them as “incomprehensible” or “nuisances”. Thus, our failure to decipher the different identities, hidden behind identical names, was our second error.
So let us try, today, to define the various elements of the problem.

There are three groups of identities that require clear definition before proceeding to resolve the “name issue”: .....



  • the identity of the land
  • the identities of peoples connected with this land
  • the identity of heritage
The first thing to keep in mind is that the term “Macedonia” defines not one but a variety of regions

a. The first “Macedonia”--historic Macedonia—refers to the Macedonian kingdom in king Philip’s times ,i.e. the 4th century, b.C. Vaguely speaking, it comprised most of present day Hellenic Macedonia, plus a southern belt of the present Republika Makedonija. Over two millennia, the land of historic Macedonia, under different rulers, underwent many territorial changes. In Byzantine times, the administrastive region, “Thema Makedonias”, identified mainly the Thracian regions of the empire, all the way to the Black Sea! In Ottoman times it disappeared completely as an administrative name.

b. The name “Macedonia”, re-emerged immediately after the Balkan wars, in 1913, as “Geniki Dioikisi Makedonias” (General Administration of Macedonia), i.e. an administrative region of the Kingdom of Greece. It covered most of the historic Macedonian regions in king Philip’s time. Today it is sub-divided into three peripheries.(“Dytiki Makedonia, Kentriki Makedonia, Anatoliki Makedonia-Thraki), recognized as regions by the European Union.

c. Thirty years later, in 1944, a second region in southern Balkans emerged, administratively identified also as “Macedonia”; it was the “People’s Republic of Macedonia”, a federative component of the PFR of Yugoslavia. It is the same region which, in late 1991, as a result of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, was transformed into an independent state. It is currently identified by its constitutional name, “Republika Makedonija”, and by the international temporary appellation, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. As such, it is referred as the tatkovina (fatherland) of the citizens of this country

d. There is, however, a fourth “Macedonia”, which is projected in maps and historical literature, mainly in this country, and is generally viewed also as the “tatkovina” of the “ethnic Macedonians”. Within its “geographic and ethnic boundaries” it comprises Hellenic Macedonia, Republika Makedonija and the smaller Pirin region of Bulgaria.


Let us now turn to the second group of identities, the noun “Macedonians”.

(a)“Macedonians” (Makedones) -- is the historic name by which the Greek-speaking people of the ancient Macedonian kingdom, identified themselves;

(b) “Macedonians” (Makedones), is the regional/cultural name of the inhabitants of the Greek administrative region “Makedonia” in northern Greece.

(c) “Macedonians” (Makedontsi) is the legal appellation (citizenship) of all the citizens of Republika Makedonija

(d) “Macedonians” (Makedontsi) are called the self-identified Slav- or ethnic- Macedonians (wherever they come from).

(e) “Macedonians” (Makedontsi), is the regional name of ethnic Bulgarians originating from a Macedonian region.

The reason I have expounded on these various Macedonia and Macedonians identities is to offer you the key to enter the labyrinth of our “name issue”. Keep in mind that each one of these names has bequeathed its own “Macedonian” derivatives to a variety of recipients. Initially, an incredible confusion emerged as to “who was what”. Soon, bitter antagonisms made their appearance on an international scale, seeking to convince outsiders that by means of their own brands of “Macedonia/Macedonian” they themselves were the rightful holders of the title deeds to the land, the peoples and the historical/cultural heritage of Macedonia. Contenders accuse each “other”, in harsh terms, for “usurpation” of their identity. A quick tour of dozens of sites and blogs on the Internet tells the sad story

The third group of identities refers to the Macedonian derivatives
To add to the confusion, the derivatives from the nouns Macedonia and Macedonians) are used by all kinds of “Macedonians” to describe or define a variety of identities touching on such contested issues as, Macedonian historical events and personalities, Macedonian traditions, Macedonian culture, Macedonian language, Macedonian origin, Macedonian ethnicity, Macedonian citizenship, and Macedonian products of all kinds.

Such conflicting claims lead to the question: Who are the “owners”, the “suitors” or, even the “usupers” of these identities?
As already stated, the core of the controversy over the names “Macedonia” and “Macedonians” are claims for title deeds to the Macedonian land, its peoples and their historical/cultural heritage.
The Greeks, today, do not raise claims over lands outside their borders. They perceive, however, the historical and cultural heritage of the ancient Macedonian kingdom as a basic ingredient of their Hellenic identity, in the same way they view the Greek city-states of the south of classical antiquity.
This explains the vast popular reaction among Greeks against the recognition of a new independent state in their neighbourhood, bearing the name “Macedonia” and using Ancient Macedonian symbols (the “Sun of Vergina”) in their national flag. Recent initiatives in this country, which have come to be known as ”antiquizatsia”, certainly have embroiled the “name issue” with elements touching sensitive chords of the Greeks, particularly the Makedones.

A second issue of identity contest, with undertones of territorial claims, emerges by the extended use—particularly in schools and in government publications-- of the map of a “united” Macedonia, portraying diachronically the alleged “geographical and ethnic boundaries” of the “tatkovina” of the Makedontsi. More disturbing to the Greeks is that Greek Macedonia, is referred as the “Egejski del na Makedonija pod Grcja” (the Aegean part of Macedonia under Greece”, (A similar treatment is reserved for the Bulgarian part which is identified as “Pirinska del na Makedonija pod Balgarija” (The Pirin part of Macedonia under Bulgaria). Strangely enough, the third part which in the past was identified as Vardarska Makedonija, is simply identified as Republika Makedonija. As both the map of the Republic and of the wider “geographical/ethnic” map, transcending three states, are identified as “Macedonia”, and indeed, as the “tatkovina” of the Makedontsi, the inference is clear that the two parts in Greece and Bulgaria are “unjustly” under foreign rule.
Thus, apart from the historical/cultural debate, the territorial issue, involving indirect claims to foreign lands, as conveyed to new generations of students in this country, certainly is one of the serious obstacles to a sincere and lasting rapprochement between the two countries.

Prospects for resolving the issue

I will not delve into the current efforts for finding a solution, for the simple reason that I am unaware of the current stage of diplomatic negotiations; if any. I could share with you, however, certain opinions which could show us paths for finding an exit from the problem, provided, of course, there is a will to find a solution.

Following Antisthenis advice, we have come to the conclusion that there are more than one “Macedonia” and a variety of “Macedonians”, which affect the identity of various derivatives. With strong arguments, both sides claim exclusivity of rights for their own Macedonian brands. To commence:

  • Step number one: We put aside direct or indirect tactics for exclusiveness of the Macedonian name and adopt the principle of “non-monopolization”.
  • Step number two: Negotiations will target at a definitive, final, not a temporary or partial solution.
  • The constitutional name, which will replace the current one as well as the temporary international appellation, will use the Macedonian name; a Macedonian name with a prefix which will describe or identify clearly the region over which this country exercises legal jurisdiction (I will not venture names, but I recall that UN mediator Nimetz has referred, among others, North, Gorna, Vardarska).
  • The new state name will apply to all uses (internal, bilateral, international)
  • The legal derivatives (citizenship), naturally, will follow the state name.
  • The corresponding ethnic or regional Macedonian identities in neighbouring countries will be mutually respected. In international languages, to avoid confusion, they will be used in untransliterated form—for example, “Vardarska Makedonija”, “Elliniki Makedonia”, “makedonsko vino”, “makedonikos halvas”.
  • Similar will be the treatment of Macedonian derivatives in international use.
  • The parties will respect the bona fide cultural heritage of each other and special clarifications will be made on this issue in relevant international documents.
Ladies and gentlemen:

I am not naïve to believe that such proposals will rally politicians and the public to endorse them overnight. Although my previous attempt in this direction, was received with certain skepticism, I was encouraged by certain positive comments and suggestions, including some from this country.
This is the reason why I have accepted your kind invitation to present my personal assessment for the “prospects for a solution of the name issues”. Provided there is a will, a solution will be found. Hopefully, in my life time…

Hilary Clinton Defends Greece on the FYROM Name Issue

Saturday, October 16, 2010

The Obama administration in Washington D.C. is pushing the  Skopian  Republic to accept the predominant name for the country which is “Vardaska Makedonija”. However the United Nations official proposal of “Northern Makedonia” remains on the table. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Hilary Clinton was very clear about the intentions of the Obama government at a recent U.S. – E.E. meetingt . During the speech from the representative of Slovenia, she intervened and strongly stated that Greece should cease negotiations with the E.U. about FYROM, and the country’s accession into NATO. Her opinion on the matter was that Prime Minister George Papandreou had stated his position, therefore it was now FYROM’s turn to respond.
She indirectly sent another message to....



 the Skopian Republic with the option of using the term “Makedonia”, referring to the northern neighborhood. Clinton has strongly supported the Greek “2014 Agenda” for the accession of the whole Balkan network of Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo into the E.E.

usa.greekreporter.com/

AMAC: Truth must prevail in Macedonian issue

Monday, October 11, 2010

11 Oct 2010
Laura Burgoine and Fotis Kapetopoulos
neoskosmos.com

The Australian Macedonian Advisory Committee's (AMAC) annual function, last Friday, was attended by three generations of Greek Australians. Chairman Con Kouremenos welcomed guests while emphasising the changes in AMAC.

"One third of AMAC's membership comprises of third generation Greek Australians," he said.

He said AMAC is an advisory body which assists in the preservation of the truth in the face of the "falsification of history in the area of Macedonian identity".

Professor John Melville-Jones from the University of Western Australia spoke about the "importance of preserving historical truth in light of attempts to distort Macedonian history."

He relayed how he....
 learned Ancient Greek and Latin as a young boy during WWII. After travelling to Greece in the 1960s he became a scholar of Byzantine history.

"What makes Greek culture different to others is its continuity throughout the ages," Prof Melville-Jones said.

He said he felt "sorry" for those from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia because"they are trying to create an identity from what does not exist - they don't want to be Bulgarian, Albanian or Serbian," he said.

Prof Melville-Jones said FYROM activists are "indoctrinated to believe" in the "myth" and that it was "too easy for myths to be accepted".

Marcus Templar from Chicago has conducted extensive research into Macedonian history. He was critical of the "Greek power elites" for not taking a more aggressive stance against a concerted effort by FYROM to "userp Greek history"

Mr Templar criticised the lack of a real Hellenic lobby in the United States and the way various Non Government Organisations, like the Centre of Democracy and Reconciliation in South Eastern Europe, were acting as trojan horses for anti Hellenic campaigns.

He said the "prevailing opinion is that the Slavic population of FYROM feel humiliated by not having an identity" as a result of the internal conflict between Albanians and Serbs.
"It's not a fault of the Greek people that the Slavic people of FYROM cannot adopt a name," he said.

Among the 150 in attendance were Victorian Parliamentary Secretary for Planning: Jenny Mikakos, member for the federal seat of Higgins: Kelly O'Dwyer, and President of the Greek Orthodox Community of Melbourne and Victoria: Bill Papastergiadis.

CSIS Recommendations as regards FYROM name issue.

Tuesday, September 28, 2010

The key challenge for the ROM/FYROM is to resolve its name dispute with Athens, which would help unblock the country’s path toward NATO and European Union accession. Basically, there are three stark choices: indefinite stalemate and no solution, which could destabilize the ROM/FYROM; pressing Greece to accept the current constitutional name and potentially undermine the Greek government at a time of economic and social convulsion; or convincing the authorities in Skopje to qualify the country’s name. Of the three, the name qualifier is likely to be the least destabilizing both for the ROM/FYROM and for Greece, as well as the broader region. On the basis of this premise, the United States would need to pursue the following approach:
  • Skopje should publicly state its readiness to accept the proposal of the UN mediator that the country’s name be qualified, whether as the Republic of North Macedonia or as Vardar Macedonia. This name should be used in all international organizations and bilateral relations. Athens in turn should respond by acknowledging the national identity and language of the majority population of its northern neighbor as Slavic Macedonian and accepting Skopje’s assurance that the use of this name does not imply any exclusivity or historical or territorial claim to the northern Greek province of Macedonia or to the Hellenic heritage of ancient Macedon.
  • Given that both Athens and Skopje dispute the meaning of Macedonian identity and believe that their rivals are either denying or claiming their identity in order to pursue a hidden agenda of irredentism or destabilization, a distinction needs to be made between Slavic Macedonian and Greek Macedonian in defining language and ethnic identity. However, the “Slavic” adjective cannot be included in the country’s name, because it would potentially alienate non-Slavic Macedonian citizens, including the large Albanian population.
  • The resolution of the name dispute needs to be tied to issuing a formal NATO membership invitation to Skopje at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010 or shortly thereafter. If no permanent solution is reached by November, both countries could agree that Skopje may receive a NATO invitation under the FYROM label pending a full settlement. Successful NATO integration for ROM/FYROM would help stabilize Greece’s northern border and raise Athens’ stature in the EU at a time when Greece faces its own domestic economic and social problems. NATO membership would in turn eliminate the insecurities expressed in Skopje that qualifying the country’s name would destabilize the state and eradicate its identity. On the contrary, the country’s integration in NATO would strengthen its position in all international institutions.
  • To achieve these results, more high-level engagement by the Obama administration to reinforce the current UN mediation process would be helpful. It is not a question of American pressure, but of potential incentives for both parties to come to an agreement with U.S. assistance. This would also necessitate a clear message from Washington that in the absence of resolution, the Balkan region will become more insecure, to the detriment of both Skopje and Athens.
FOR FAIR USE ONLY
Source: Abstract (pages 88-89)Report of Western Balkans Policy -Review 2010, article (ROM/FYROM,pages 82-89) by Janusz Bugajski

FYROM's Foreign Policy Objectives and the Name issue.

Saturday, September 25, 2010

The FYROM name issue is not simply a dispute over historical facts and symbols. It is a problem with regional and international dimensions, given that FYROM is exercising a policy of irredentism and territorial claims fuelled by the falsification of history and the usurpation of Greeces historical and national heritage. It is also a problem   of a «cultural genocide».

The first steps of the former Yugoslav "Socialist Republic of Macedonia" towards independent statehood bear the marks of nationalistic visions mixed with territorial expansionism.

It is not a coincidence that, as a result of the first democratic elections (December 1990), the party which won first place in popular votes and parliamentary seats was the "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation" (VMRO). Its platform declared specifically its intention to work for the unification of all the Macedonian lands in one state: the "Republic of Macedonia".

Similarly, VMRO's electoral poster depicted a map of a united Macedonia which included the whole of Greek Macedonia, as well as the Pirin district in Bulgaria.

In November 1993, under the influence of nationalists, the Gligorov government prepared and passed through Parliament the Constitution of the "Republic of Macedonia". In its preamble, the Constution stated that the new republic rests upon "the statehood–legal traditions" of the "Republic of Krushevo" (1903) and of ASNOM (1944). Both events are considered in Stopje as the first steps toward the establishment of an independent and united Macedonian state. It is worth quoting certain paragraphs from the ASNOM documents of August 21, 1944:

"Macedonians under Bulgaria and Greece,
...The unification of the entire Macedonian people depends on your participation in the gigantic anti-fascist front. Only by fighting the vile fascist occupier will you gain your right to self-determination and unification of the entire Macedonian people within the framework of Tito's Yugoslavia, which has become a free community of emancipated and equal people. May the struggle of the Macedonian Piedmont incite you to even bolder combat against the fascist oppressors!"

And in a Proclamation to the people of Macedonia issued on August 4, 1944, it was stated:

"...In the course of three years of combat you have achieved your unity, developed your army,: and laid the basis for the federal Macedonian state. With the participation of the entire Macedonian nation in the struggle against the fascist occupiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece you will achieve unification of all parts of Macedonia, divided in 1915 and 1918 by Balkan imperialists" .
To popularise these visions, official or semi-official agencies and private enterprises in FYROM put in circulation all kinds of maps, calendars, car stickers, posters depicting the "homeland" of Skopje's "Macedonians" ;-not within the borders of FYROM but all the way to the Aegean coast, the city of Thessaloniki and Mt. Olympus! This is happening not in 1903 or 1944, but in 1992, 1993, 1994.

More ominous for the future was the publication of identical maps and texts of a similar mentality in the new school textbooks of history, published by President Gligorov's Ministry of Education in 1992-1993.

Thus, in no uncertain terms, it becomes clear that the new state was launched, from the very beginning, on a course of territorial expansionism.

At a closer look, one can observe certain striking similarities of the aims of present-day FYROM nationalists and those of the Bulgarian revolutionaries at the turn of the 19th century in Ottoman-held Macedonia; or those of the Bulgarian fascists during the Second World War; or, finally, of the Yugoslav communists during the first post-World War II years.

In all cases, the vision of terroristsguerillas-political activists was–and continues to be–identical: to unite all Macedonian lands into a unified entity, despite the different ethnological composition of these lands. Where these fighters or activists differed was their choice of the beneficiary. In the late l9th century and all the way to the Second World War, the aspiring beneficiary was nationalist or fascist Bulgaria. Later, it was Tito's communist Yugoslavia. Now, it is Gligorov's–or his successor's–"democratic" FYROM.

Under the circumstances, one could hardly blame the Greeks, particularly those of the northern Greek provinces, if they view suspiciously the nationalistic claims of a new-born state in their backyard. After all, in the span of this century, they have experienced two foreign occupations and one Civil War, supported by neighbouring countries coveting Greek Macedonia and Thrace.

Let us take a glimpse at some not too distant historical events.

During the First World War, Bulgaria attempted to annex the Macedonian regions of her neighbours, Greece and Serbia, by espousing the cause of the Central Powers and Turkey. Indeed, with the support of Kaizer's Germany it managed to occupy Greek Eastern Macedonia where ethnic cleansing-type tactics were applied against the Greek population. The defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary terminated Bulgarian occupation. Having failed to annex the coveted territory,- Bulgaria subsequently sought to promote the idea of an autonomous Macedonian state.

Once again, during the second World War, Bulgaria, allied to nazi Germany and fascist Italy, was given in exchange the right to occupy large parts of Greek Macedonia and Thrace all the way to the Aegean coast. Bulgarian occupation authorities, benefiting by World War I experiences, reverted to their familiar policy of ethnic cleansing. The collapse of the Axis terminated the second Bulgarian occupation of Greek Macedonia (1941–1944).

It is interesting to note that this was not only the policy of the Bulgarian ruling elites of the time, but also that of the Bulgarian Communist Party. It is a fact that during the interwar period, the Soviet Union under Stalin endorsed a proposal by Bulgarian Communists for a united and independent Macedonian state in the framework of a Balkan Communist Federation.

In 1944, it was Tito's turn, who set up the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The federal form of the state was meant to solve the problem of quarrelling nationalities and ethnic minorities within Yugoslavia. He set up the "People's Republic of Macedonia" (formerly known as the "Province of the Vardar"), and sought to annex to it the Macedonian provinces of neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria.

This brief historical expose is didactic in many respects. It brings out the fact that neighbours of Greece, irrespective of international alignments or internal political regimes, have pursued, throughout the 20th century, schemes for expansion towards Greek Macedonia and Thrace. Furthermore, it supports the thesis that no single Balkan neighbour dared to challenge Greek sovereignty over the two Greek northern provinces, unless it was in alliance with one or more external great Powers.

The succession of these great Powers is worth recording.

Certainly, Greece and the Greek people do not feel threatened today by a weak FYROM. Nevertheless, the logical assumption that comes to the minds not only of the Greeks but all those who know the history of the Balkans is a simple one: if FYROM is allowed to develop on a nationalist, expansionist and even revanchist course, then it is bound to seek its own patron who will hand over to it the "promised lands".

The case of the Gruevski regime is unique. Is a expression of political hegemony of mr. Gruevski and his intention is to change the history, the society and the aesthetics of the country , while he spoke of a ''De-Slavisation plan'' .

This is the context of the irredentist efforts that have been mounted by FYROMs political leadership to nurture in the countrys citizens via school books and propaganda the notion that they are the descendents of the ancient Macedonians, thus cultivating the concept of a United Macedonia, a portion of which is FYROM, with other parts under Greek, Bulgarian and Albanian occupation. It is clear that the irredentist doctrine of a United Macedonia opens the way to claims on occupied territories.

For Greece, the definitive settlement of the matter and the finding of a mutually acceptable solution remain the sole objective. Greeces shift from its initial negotiating position accepting the idea of a compound name that includes the term Macedonia on the condition that there is also a geographical qualifier is proof of the constructive spirit and good faith in which Greece has approached the negotiations under the UN to date.

FYROM has opted for propaganda over dialogue, mounting a well-prepared, calculated smear campaign against Greece, while also trying to insinuate various non-issues into the negotiations, attempting to turn the talks into a platform for grievances, demands and claims against Greece. FYROM has even tried to reopen World War II issues that European countries have put behind them for good; issues that have no place in our common journey towards ever closer union.

The problem is simple. The geographical area of Macedonia is since the Middle Ages a multiethnic region. It is not the homeland of one single nation. He tort of Skopje is that while as a state and an ethnicity is a Part, it portrays itself as if it is the Whole. They call their country ‘Macedonia’, their ethnicity and language ‘macedonian’, because through these names they are trying to register mortgages in all of Macedonia. The rhetoric for the great macedonian dismembered homeland is serving this view.

In the name of Peace and stability in the Balkans -not only in our times but for future generations- it is important that the new state should be helped to divest itself of the legacies of the past, i.e. of the nationalist Bulgarian and communist Yugoslav mentality. T
hus:
  • the contested articles of its Constitution should be deleted or amended in order to free political leaders of binding constitutional obligations -or the temptation- to pursue expansionist designs;
  • the school textbooks of history should be rewritten to put an end to the indoctrination of young children with grandiose, chimerical visions of a greater Macedonia;
  • internationally binding treaties should guarantee that the new state would sincerely accept the sovereignty of neighbouring states over their respective Macedonian provinces;
  • and, above all, the name "Republic of Macedonia", a perpetrator of territorial expansionism, should be abandoned with no delay.
If such initiatives are taken and such guarantees are given, Greece would be the first to extend its hand in support of the new neighbouring state to its north. Prohibition of the abuse of rights is a general principle of law found time and again in international legal practice; and it comes higher up in the hierarchy than the rules governing the exercise, by the subjects of international law, of their individualized rights. Macedonian identity is part of the identity of every single Greek citizen and we will not negotiate on that  as Greek Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas remarked.

The role of the Communist International in the hatching of the “Macedonian nation”.

Saturday, June 19, 2010

By Spyridon Sfetas
Abstract from the article “The Birth of ‘Macedonianism’ in the Interwar Period” and the book “The History of Macedonia, Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 2010”.

In historiography the view that the 'Macedonian nation' was a creation of Tito is widespread. This position can of course not be denied, since the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) had particular reasons for promoting 'Macedonianism' in Yugoslav Macedonia as a counterweight ideology to Bulgarian-Serbian competition in the interwar period. The need to detach the Slavs of Macedonia from Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian influence with the creation of a collective Slav-Macedonian identity had already been underscored in the early 20th century by a number of Slav intellectuals, such as Krste Misirkov, Stefan Dedov, Diamandi Misajkov and Dimitrija Cupovski. Foreseeing that the antagonism between Serbs and Bulgarians was continuing at the expense of the local population and that it only perpetuated Turkish rule, they sought to have the Slavs of Macedonia acknowledged as a separate community (millet). Even so, the political conditions of the early 20th century did not favour the advocacy of Slav-Macedonianism as a new collective ethnic identity, and its early proponents had very little impact on the masses. The political and ideological origins of 'Macedonianism' were essentially posed by the Third Communist International (the Comintern) in the interwar period. It is documented that the Communist International saw the Macedonian question as a tactical issue, relating to the political conditions of the time.[1] The publication of important documents for the period 1923-1925 from the Comintern archive has essentially confirmed the view that there were specific reasons as to why the Communist International was promoting a United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Soviet Republic. These were to assist IMRO in its attempt to create a unified front between the Bulgarian Communists, the Bulgarian Farmers and Bulgarian-Macedonian organizations for the advance of the revolution in Bulgaria, the establishment of a government of workers and farmers and the destabilization of the Balkan states.[2] According to the Communist International, the Macedonian organisations in Bulgaria should not only disassociate themselves from the influence of Bulgarian 'bourgeois' political elements, but also estrange themselves from Bulgarian nationalism. Criticising the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) for the neutral stand it took during the coup against the agrarian government of Aleksandr Stambolijski, Karl Radek expressed himself in the following way at the plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (12-13 June 1923) in Moscow:


'The Macedonian Question has played an important role throughout the whole of Bulgaria's modern history. Macedonia, in which there reside peasants of whom it is difficult to say if they are Serbs or Bulgarian, is an old object of discord between Bulgaria and Serbia. After Bulgaria's defeat in the war, the Agrarian party of Stambolijski gave up [contesting] Macedonia. It gave up not only formally, and in Nis it signed a treaty with Yugoslavia on the basis of which Stambolijski would persecute the old Macedonian organisations. From a social perspective, these are organisations of small and poor peasants. They have a revolutionary past, they have struggled against the rule of the Turkish landowners, against the Serbian bourgeoisie, they have illegal revolutionary organisations. There has been sympathy for the Russian Revolution for a while now. The Macedonian organizations were a social factor with which we could have connected... The Party has done nothing and its neglect of the Macedonian Question is typical. [3]


Instead of the term 'Bulgarian people', as this was used in previous declarations of the Third International, the terms 'Macedonian people' and 'Macedonian population without national distinctions' were introduced in 1923-24. The aim of the Communist International was that all nationalities in Macedonian would develop an indigenous Macedonian consciousness as one 'people' from a political perspective, and aspire to a United and Independent Macedonia so as to undermine the 'bourgeois' Balkan states.

The new line imposed at the 6th Conference of the Balkan Communist Federation (Moscow, December 1923) and the fifth Congress of the Communist International (17/6 - 8/7/1924) was for a 'United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Federation', which would be achievable 'only if the struggle of the Macedonian people is aligned with the struggle of the workers and peasants of the Balkans'. It is obvious that such a policy aimed at the undermining of the Balkan states, including Bulgaria. In a letter to IMRO in July 1924, the Communist International set as a precondition for its assistance the obligation of the organization to begin the revolution in Bulgaria, with the aim of expelling the Bulgarian state organs from the Bulgarian section of Macedonia, and its proclamation as an independent state.[4] The pressure exercised by the Communist International on the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) in 1924 to accept the decision of the fifth Congress of the Communist International on the Macedonian Question can be explained by its policy toward IMRO. The wing of the KKE that accepted the new line justified its position with the argument that, to the degree that support for a 'United and Independent Macedonia' contributed to the successful outcome of the revolution in Bulgaria and the Balkans, then the KKE, as an internationalist party, was obliged to accept it, even coming into conflict with the Greek bourgeoisie.[5]

The term 'Macedonian nation', identified exclusively and emphatically with the Slav element of Macedonia, had not yet appeared in the texts of the Communist International, but the Macedonian Question was no longer considered simply a Bulgarian issue. The plan of the Communist International failed, but Soviet involvement in the Macedonian Question resulted in the political and ideological polarisation of the Bulgarian-Macedonian initiative. As an ideological and political counterweight to the IMRO of Ivan Mihajlov, an IMRO (United) was founded in Vienna in October 1925, under the mantle of the Communist International. On the Central Committee of IMRO (United) there was a communist wing and a national-revolutionary wing, which, although it disagreed with the communist orientation of the organization, was counting on the assistance of the Soviet Union for a review of the peace treaty. In 1928, with the decisions of the sixth Congress of the Communist International, the national-revolutionary wing of the Central Committee of IMRO (United) was eliminated, and the organization now acquired a narrowly communist character, with Dimitar Vlahov and Vladimir Pop-tomov, members of the Bulgarian Communist Party, in a leading role. The influence of the IMRO (United) in the Balkans was insignificant, given that it was first based in Vienna and later in Berlin and that its newspaper, the Makedonsko Delo (Macedonian Question) published in Bulgarian, was not easily accessible in the Balkans. Until 1928, small groups of the IMRO (United) had been formed only in the Serbian section of Macedonia. They were of little political significance and were expunged completely by the Serbian authorities in 1929. The first nucleuses of the organisation were formed in Bulgaria in 1928. Yet, due to its narrow communist character and the enmity of Mihajlov's IMRO, IMRO (United) could not evolve into a significant political factor in Bulgaria, and was limited to a propaganda role amongst the Bulgarian-Macedonian refugees. The basic political line of the organization was a 'United and Independent Macedonia' within a Balkan Federation, and by Macedonian people they meant all the ethnicities of Macedonia (Bulgarians, Albanians, Turks, Jews, Vlachs, Greeks, Gypsies). In a memorandum (10/9/1927) on the condition of the oppressed peoples of the Balkans to the president of the Council for National Minorities in Geneva, they noted characteristically:

'In Serbian Macedonia all Belgrade governments, regardless of their differences in domestic and foreign policy, apply the same policy as regards the Macedonians. The Macedonian people, that is all the nationalities that live there and in whose name we speak - Bulgarians, Albanians, Turks, Jews, Greeks, Gypsies - are denied political and civil rights. All Serbian authori¬ties have treated them and continue to treat them as though they are Serbs... If we were to examine how the Macedonian people lives from Greek work, we would see that here the situation is the same. The Greek authorities expelled the Turks from Macedonia, after having first plundered them. They impose many impediments on the Jews, so as to force them to move else¬where. They expel the Bulgarians as well... There is no difference between the Greek and the Serb governments as regards the nationalities in Macedonia. Greece treats these nationalities as though they were slaves. If we examine the Bulgarian section of Macedonia, we would see that the situa¬tion here is similar to that in the Serbian and Greek sections. The Greek and Turk Macedonians who lived here before were expelled. The population that lives in this section of Macedonia, indeed of Bulgarian nationality, enjoys cultural rights. It has schools, churches, etc. And this is the only difference between the condition of the Macedonians in Bulgaria and those in Greece and Serbia... From every other perspective, the condition of the Macedonians in this section of Macedonia does not differ from that of those under Greek and Serbian rule, and in some cases is even worse. The political regime in the Macedonia under Bulgarian rule is one of the most tyrannical in the world. As for the economic situation to which the Bulgarian Macedo¬nians have been abandoned to live in, this is especially tragic.[6]

Which factors were influential in the abandonment of this position and the adoption of the view that there existed a 'Macedonian nation', exclusively identified with the Slavic group? The access to the Comintern Archive that we enjoy today allows us to follow this process much more completely.

The old view is generally confirmed, that with Hitler's rise to power the Comintern wished to avoid exploitation of the Macedonian Question by Nazi Germany in favour of Bulgaria in the upcoming war, as had happened during the First World War. In 1933 Mihajlov's IMRO had accepted the IMRO (United) position for a Unified and Independent Macedonia, as a second Bulgarian state, considering the national identity of Bulgarian compatible with the political name of Macedonian. The need for a not only ideological and political campaign, but also a national one against Mihajlov's IMRO, was thus now clear. The efforts of the Comintern to prevent the exploitation of Yugoslavia’s ethnic problems, especially the Croatian, by Nazi Germany had a significant effect. The issue of the foundation of a national Croat and Slovenian Party was thus quickly posed, so that the now nationally-based Communist Parties would henceforth deal with the country's ethnic problems. Given the new conditions, Yugoslavia should act as a bulwark to Nazi Germany's efforts to penetrate the Balkans.

As soon as Vladimir Poptomov, a member of the Central Committee of the IMRO (United), was informed that the situation of the organisation and the prospect of 'revolu¬tionary action' were to be discussed within the Comintern, he submitted a memorandum on 15/11/1933 to the Secretariat of the Balkan States (Balkanlander Sekretariat, hence¬forth BLS), the Comintern organ responsible for the Balkans. He attributed the causes for the failure of IMRO (United) to develop into a mass organisation to its centralised character, the problems in distributing the newspaper Makedonsko Delo, and the diffi¬culties in reading and understanding the newspaper in Greece and Yugoslavia, since it was published in the scholarly Bulgarian language.[7] Poptomov placed particular importance on the different socio-political conditions that prevailed in the three sections of the wider area of Macedonia, the continuous Serbisation and Hellenisation of the Slavic population, with the result that the younger generations could only easily read and speak the Greek or Serbian languages. As such, according to Poptomov, the newspaper Makedonsko Delo could only be understood by the Bulgarian-Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria. He proposed the decentralisation of the organisation, that a national-revolutionary organisation be founded in every section of Macedonia under the guidance of the Communist Parties and with the slogan 'self-determination of the Macedonian people until the secession of a sovereign and unified Macedonia’.[8] Perhaps the main point of Poptomov's essay was the danger of Serbisation and Hellenisation succeeding.

At the meeting of the Office of the BLS on 20 December 1933, the proposal of Rilski - pseudonym of Georgi Karadzov, a member of the Bulgarian IMRO (United) -for the IMRO (United) was examined;[9] his position on the right of the 'Macedonian people' to secede, for a Unified and Independent Macedonia, for a Balkan federation of workers, was ratified.[10] The question of the ethnicity of the Macedonians was also posed, and 'a special examination of the question was deemed necessary, if possible with the participation of the comrades who have arrived from Macedonia.'[11] Vlahov was also in attendance at the meeting of 22 December 1933. The issue of the drafting of a decision for IMRO (United) was posed, with the ethnicity of the Macedonians at its core. This task was assigned to Vlahov, Rilski and German, pseudonym of the Bulgarian communist Pavle Gicev, who were given three days in which to present the draft decision.[12]The basic points of the decision were as follows:

'The national question of Macedonia is particularly closely tied to the question of the war and the question of international social revolution. The rare peculiarity of historical evolution created here, from an ethnic perspective, a situation of which there is no comparison anywhere else in Europe... After the Balkan and the imperialist wars, Macedonia was divided between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. There followed an artificial movement of populations from whole regions, settlements, violent denationalization and assimilation... The Macedonian people see the danger in which they will be as long as capitalism and imperialism exist, as long as the large imperialist centers continue to exploit the small Balkan states... The country's population, which has passed through so many wars, has realized that the new imperial war could lead to its complete physical annihilation, if war is not prevented by a prior uprising and the victory of the social revolution in Europe. This situation has rallied all the working population of this section of the Balkan peninsula into one totality, and has created a peculiar situation here, that the population that speaks Slavic and the population that speaks the languages of the minorities feel the same national oppression, economic exploitation and pillaging. They have common interests at the present moment and feel the necessity for a common defence, for when the future historical events arrive.

The working masses of Macedonia do not characterize themselves and they do not want to be either Bulgarians or Serbs, they consider the governments of the Greeks and the Turks as foreign powers. They characterize themselves as the predominant Macedonian whole... This is where the idea of national Macedonian rule is found, the right of the full national self-determination of the Macedonians, the idea of a unified and independent Macedonian workers democracy, in a common struggle against imperialism and for social revolution.'[13]

The main section of the draft plan referred to the upcoming war, using the terms 'Macedonian people' and 'working masses of Macedonia', indicating all the nationalities of Macedonia, Slav and non-Slav, as a unified total coming under the term 'people'. This specificity legitimated the right to a unified and independent Macedonian state 'of the working masses'. In essence, this draft plan did not differ from previous IMRO (United) declarations, with the simple difference that, for tactical purposes, mention was no longer made of Soviet democracies or Balkan federations. The draft plan was not deemed satisfactory and, at the meeting of the BLS on 28 December 1933, which Vlahov did not attend, German (pseudonym of Gicev) was given until 31 December 1933 to submit the text of a final decision to the Office of the BLS.=[14]

Yet, the text submitted to the BLS on 31 December 1933 was similar to the previous draft plan:

'After the Balkan and imperial wars - the result of which was that the unified from a geographical and economic perspective area of Macedonia was divided into three parts between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria - the economic and political condition of the Macedonian population has worsened even further... As a result of this policy, the old ethnographic physiognomy of some sections of Macedonia almost changed radically - in the Greek section of Macedonia - and to the degree that the local populations that remained there are prohibited, with the threat of capital punishment, of speaking their mother tongue (in the Macedonia under Serbian or Greek rule)... The overwhelming majority of the working population of Macedonia, which lives in Macedonia or as a refugee elsewhere, despite the differences existing in religion and language and the discord that has been artificially created over the centuries, constitutes a whole, with common economic and political interests at the present moment and feels the need for a common defence, for when the great future historic events arrive. Having as a basis the realization of the need to preserve the common economic and political unity of Macedonia in the interest of its physical existence, [the population] demands the right to national self-determination and even the secession of an independent Macedonian state. The Macedonian masses do not want to belong neither to Bulgaria nor to Serbia nor to Greece, despite the fact that, from the point of view of language and religion, different sections of the Macedonian population are more closely related to the population of one or another Balkan state. Bearing all this in mind, the Balkan proletariat must support the national liberation struggle of the Macedonian people for national liberation and unity in every way, teaching it always consistently and surely that only the total defeat of imperialism will free the Macedonian people from the danger of total physical annihilation, a threat which it always finds it itself under given its geographical position. '[15]

The Balkan Communists had not grasped the essence of the problem. This was, of course, the matter of the identity of the Slavs of Macedonia, whom revisionist Bulgaria considered as unredeemed Bulgarians, something that would lead to Bulgaria joining the German camp in the upcoming war. The questioning of the Bulgarian identity of the Slavs of Macedonia would deny Bulgaria the right to make claims. Already during the Balkan Conferences (1930 - 1933) Bulgaria had insisted on the signing of bilateral treaties for the protection of minorities. This should characterise the spirit of the decision. During the meeting of the BLS on 3 January 1934, then, German's text was rejected and the intervention of leading Comintern cadres was necessary. The participation of Vasil Kolarov in amending the draft decision is acknowledged.[16] The new text was presented at the meeting of the BLS on 7 January 1934, and was ratified by the Political Office of the Executive Committee of the Communist international at a closed meeting on 11 January 1934. According to the brief proceedings of the meeting, a discussion was held in which Vlahov, Kolarov, German and others participated. Unfortunately, the views that they presented have not been recorded. The Political Office accepted the text of the proposal as a basis, and commissioned the BLS 'to compose a final text on the basis of the views exchanged and in agreement with comrade Kuusinen. The slogan 'Workers Democracy' should remain in the decision'. [17] The intervention of the higher cadres of the Comintern - including otto Kuusinen, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and member of the Finnish Communist Party - was, therefore, decisive for the final formulation of the decision on the Macedonian Question and the IMRO (United). The decision differed significantly from the draft decision of 31 December 1933.

'In conditions of increased international and class conflicts, the direct danger of new wars and the maturing of the revolutionary crisis, the Macedonian national-revolutionary movement, the head of which is the IMRO (United), plays the role of an important element and ally of the working class, the peasantry and all the oppressed nationalities in the struggle to overturn the domination of the bourgeois class and the landowners in the three states that enslaved Macedonia.

'The division of Macedonia, which was the foundation of the alliance between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece in the war against Turkey and which immediately emerged as an issue that led to a new war between Serbia, Greece and others against Bulgaria, constitutes in the post-war period a permanent cause for the rise in conflict and the struggle between the three states for rule over the whole of Macedonia and access to the Aegean. On the other hand, the great imperialist states turned Macedonia into a bridgehead for political activities during the imperialist World War, and are now exploiting the Macedonian Question to strengthen their positions in the Balkans. Macedonia is thus one of the centres of the upcoming imperialist war.

'The states that exist in Macedonia apply a pillaging economic policy that sucks the workers, waging terror and national oppression... The dominant nations of the three imperialist states that divided Macedonia justify national oppression by denying the national specificities of the Macedonian people, by denying the existence of a Macedonian nation. Greek chauvinism declares that the indigenous Slav population in the part of Macedonia that she rules over is constituted of Greeks who had been Slavised in the past centuries, who through violence must "return" to Greek culture, prohibiting them from speaking or learning their mother tongue. The great Serb chauvinists, invoking the existence of Serbian loanwords in the language of the local Macedonian population, declare that this population is one of the "tribes» of the unified Yugoslav nation and they Serbise it through violence. Finally, Bulgarian nationalism, exploiting the relationship of the Macedo¬nian language with the Bulgarian, declares them to be Bulgarians and thus justifies the occupation of the region of Petritsi and its pillaging policy toward the whole of Macedonia. By waging a struggle against the division and enslavement of the Macedonian people, against every kind of national, cultural, social and economic oppression, IMRO (United) must uncover the true meaning of all the sophisms that deny the Macedonians the character of a nation, and not allow them to spread throughout its environment... IMRO (United) must organize and wage a daily struggle against all types of national oppression, against every extraordinary law, for the right to the use of the mother tongue in all state and public institutions, for the freedom to have schools, publications, etc. in the mother tongue... In this struggle, the central slogan of IMRO (United) must be the slogan for the right of the nation to self-determination as far as secession and the achievement of a unified, Macedonian workers democracy.[18]

The differentiation between the meanings 'Macedonian people' (i.e. all the ethnicities of Macedonia and with the political meaning of the term 'people') and 'Macedonian nation' as a national community with reference only to the Slavs is clear. Since the efforts of the Comintern to exploit the Macedonian Question to promote revolution had so far not brought the desired results, the appeal to the national idea was deemed more effective. Was, however, the decision a reflection of real conditions, or had the division of Macedonia created a feeling of unity amongst the Slavs, with a need to detach themselves from the Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian national ideas? As mentioned, the developments in the three sections were different. The Slav population used the term (Slav-) Macedonians as a geographical term, but also as a anodyne term that could neutralize the perhaps dangerous public self-characterization of 'Bulgarian' in Yugoslavia and Greece, and which could express a localism with the meaning of 'autochthon' in contrast to the migrants, the Serb settlers or the Greek refugees. In terms of consciousness, the sense of difference from the Greek or Serb idea was expressed more in pro-Bulgarian terms,[19] to the extent that we cannot talk about individuals with a fluid identity.

In the historiography of Skopje it is argued that the decision of the Communist International signified the first recognition of the 'Macedonian nation' as an objective reality in international arenas, something of great importance for subsequent developments. But, as arises from the proceedings of the meetings, the differing contents of the texts of the draft decision and the final decision indicate that the 'Macedonian nation' was not immediately considered a given reality. The Communist International did not mention the prime movers of Slav-Macedonian separatism, nor did it clarify the particu¬lar national characteristics of the 'Macedonians', which distinguished them from the Serbs, Greeks or Bulgarians. It is characteristic that in the draft and the decision for IMRO (United) even the Balkan Communists were unable to conceive the meaning of 'nationality of the Macedonians' as a specific 'Slav-Macedonian nation'. There is no doubt that this was a political decision of the Comintern that was imposed on the Balkan Communist parties. This decision questioned the right of the Bulgarians and of Mihajlov's IMRO to contest the liberation of the 'Macedonians' as unredeemed Bulgarians. At the same time, it eliminated the differences between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communists over the ethnic identity of the 'Macedonians'. The Balkan Communist parties were now called upon to transform the geographical term 'Macedonians' into an ethnic term, with exclusive reference to Slavs. Within the new global conditions, after the rise of Nazism, a strong Yugoslavia had to constitute a barrier to Hitler's expansion in the Balkans. Recognition of the national specificity of the 'Macedonians' and the questioning of Bulgarian and Serbian contestations meant that the Macedonian Question could be resolved within the context of a new, federal Yugoslavia. It was not a coincidence then that, at the meeting of the BLS on 5 January 1934, it was decided, alongside the decision on the existence of a 'Macedonian nation', to establish a Croatian and a Slovenian Communist Party within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.[20]

Yet, there is still the anthropological aspect ndependent of the political goals of the Communist International, what impact could the call for the existence of a 'Macedonian nation' have on the simple peasants of the wider Macedonian region? Was it ultimately an incumbent, alienated identity? As already mentioned, the term 'Macedonian' was used by the Slavs as a geographical, localized term, and the villagers called the Slavic idiom 'Macedonian'. From this perspective, there was no name issue. The geographical term 'Macedonian' could take on a national dimension in the consciousness of the villages, if there was a political dynamic to promote this transformation, and if the political conditions required it, as indeed was the case during the Second World War. The fact should not be ignored that the Slav population in Serbian Macedonia was the victim of Serb-Bulgarian antagonism and of Greek-Bulgarian antagonism in Greek Macedonia. On the one hand, it was forced by IMRO to shelter the comitadjis, to declare itself Bulgarian and to maintain a Bulgarian position. Yet, on the other, it was persecuted by the Serbian military organizations, when it harboured IMRO, and was undergoing political Serbisation. It was natural that it would be experiencing a crisis of national identity.

For the Greeks, there was the saga of the Politis-Kalfov Protocol, the subsequent insistence of Bulgaria that the Greek governments recognise a Bulgarian minority, and the general revisionist policy of Sofia made urgent the need for the Hellenisation of other language speakers in Greek Macedonia. Regardless of the long-term potential successes of Serbisation and Hellenisation, the alternative solution of the 'Macedonian nation' operated as a balance to traditional Serb-Bulgarian and Greek-Bulgarian antagonism and provided the population with a sense of security. Political elements could easily concoct a national ideology to service the needs of this 'ethnogenesis', with unclear dividing lines between myth and historical fact, so as to lend the Slavs of Macedonia a 'glorious' past.

The subsequent policy of the Comintern on the Macedonian issue was determined by the need to constitute a unified anti-fascist front along the spirit of the decisions of the Seventh and final Congress of the Communist International (25/7-20/8/1935). Immediately after the Congress, and in the aftermath of the assassination of the king of Yugoslavia Aleksander Karadjordjevic, in October 1934 orders were given to the Balkan Communist Parties to gain the support of the 'Macedonian masses' for this front. The formation of a unified anti-fascist front along with the 'bourgeois regimes' made the continued existence of IMRO (United) as a separate political organization unnecessary. The slogan of an 'Independent Macedonia' was abandoned in favour of campaigning for basic national, political and economic rights and freedoms.

The Seventh Congress of the Communist International provided the Balkan Communist Parties with the opportunity to shape their tactics in a manner that was to a great extent autonomous. Their position on the existence of a 'Macedonian nation', however, was a new factor, which they were obliged to take into account in their policies.

Notes
1. For an initial approach, see Sp. Sfetas, Opseis tou Makedonikou Zitimatos ston 20o aiona [Aspects of the Macedonian Question in the 20th century], Thessaloniki 2001,
pp. 55-78.
2. See the documents collected in L.I. Zila and V.T. Popovski, Makedonskij Vopros v Dokumentov Kominterna, Tom I. Cast 1, 1923-1925 gg. [The Macedonian Question in the documents of the Communist International, Vol. A, Part A, 1923-1925], Skopje 1999.
3. See K. Radek, 'Der Umsturz in Bulgarien', Die Kommunistische Internationale, 27 (15. 8. 1923), pp. 115-116.
4. See Sp. Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen 1920-1924, Munich
1992, p. 320.
5. On these debates, see Sfetas, Makedonien, pp. 434-440.
6. See VMRO (Obedineta), Dokumenti i Materiali, Kniga I [IMRO (United). Docu¬ments and Materials, Vol. A], ed. Ivan Katardziev, Skopje 1991, pp. 129-137 (here pp. 131, 133-134).
7. Rossijski Centr Hranenija i Izucenija Dokumentov Novejsej Istorii (henceforth RCHIDNI, Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of the Records of Con¬temporary History),   Fond 509 (henceforth F-Series), Opis 1, (henceforth Op Catalogue), Delo 164 (henceforth D-File), Confidential, Letter from Poptomov to the Secretariat of the Balkan States,  15/11/1933.
8. Ibid.
9. it has not been possible to locate the proposal in the Archives.
10. RCHIDNI, F.495, Op. 69, D.56. Proceedings of the meeting of 20 December 1933.
11. ibid.
12. RCHIDNI, F.495, Op. 69, D.56. Proceedings of the meeting of 22 December 1933.
13. RCHIDNI, F.509, Op.169, (no indication on folder) - Proekt rezolucii o makedon-skoj 'nacii' 1933, [Draft for the decision on the Macedonian 'nation', 1933].
14. RCHIDNI, F.459, Op.69, D.56, Proceedings of the meeting of 28 December 1933.
15. RCHIDNI, F.509, Op.169, (no indication on folder), O prave makedonskogo naroda na samoopredelenie, 31/12/1933 [On the right of the Macedonian people for self-determination, 31/12/1933].
16. See 'Dokumenti. Rezoljucijata po Makedonskijat Vapros', [Documents. The deci¬sion on the Macedonian Question], Vremena, 1 (1992), pp. 100-111.
17. RCHIDNI, F. 495, Op. 3, D. 402 'Resolutionentwurf des Balkan - LS uber die makedoniche Frage und die AMRO (Vereinigte). Wird als Grundlage angenommen. Das Balkan - LS wird beauftragt, den Entwurf auf Grund der Meinungsaustausches endgultig zu redigieren und mit dem Gen. Kuusinen zu vereinbarren. Die Losung', Republik der Werktatigen 'soll in der Resolution bleiben'. It does not appear from the Comintern Archives that the role of Vlahov in processing the decision was im¬portant, contrary to what he claims in his Memoirs. See D. Vlahov, Memoari [Recollections], Skopje 1970, p. 357.
18. See the collected documents published by the Central Archive Directorate and the State Archives, BKP, Komiternat i Makedonskijat Vapros, (1917-1946), Tom Vtori, [The Bulgarian Communist Party, the Communist International and the Macedonian Question 1917-1946, Vol. B], Sofia 1999, pp. 881-884.
19. The interview (1975) with Mihalis Keramitzis, member of the KKE before the war and leading cadre of SNOF and NOF during the Occupation and the Civil War is re¬vealing. 'Then [1939] I had no idea about such things: Macedonians, Macedonia, Macedonian Question, Committee, etc. The same went for all our Macedonian cad¬res. I felt the same thing that a Greek communist felt. To the extent that I felt something different as a Slav, I felt that I was a Bulgarian...' See E. Kofos, 'TO Makedoniko stis scheseis KKE-KKY kata ta teli tou 1944' ['The Macedonian Question in the relations between the KKE and the Yugoslav Communist Party in late 1944'], in the collective volume Makedonia kai Thraki 1941-1944. Katochi-Antistasi-Apeleftherosi [Macedonia and Thrace. Occupation-Resistance-Liberation], IMXA (269), Thessaloniki 1998, p. 131.
20. See RCHIDNI, F. 495, Op. 69, D. 63. Proceedings of the meeting of 5 January 1934.